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Of late, leading legal scholars have argued that the First Amendment should not stand in
the way of restrictions on freedom of expression intended to alleviate discrimination. A
powerful, normative defense of the First Amendment from the competing claims of the
antidiscrimination agenda is therefore greatly needed.
This Essay seeks to provide the outlines of such a defense. Part I of this Essay argues
that an unregulated marketplace of ideas is preferable to government restrictions on
freedom of expression, not because the marketplace of ideas is efficient and always leads
to benign results, but because the alternative of government regulation is far worse. Part
II of this Essay defends the ability of judges to enforce a relatively neutral conception of
freedom of expression from Stanley Fish and others who argue that 'there is no such thing
as free speech.' Fish and his allies ignore cultural and social incentives and restraints that
prevent judges from simply voting in favor of their preferred political outcomes. Part III
of this Essay critiques scholars who argue that courts should tolerate partial restrictions
on freedom of expression until certain egalitarian goals are met. Such views rely on a
naive conception of politics that bears little relation to how political markets actually
work. Part IV of this Essay argues that if the courts were to allow the First Amendment
to be subordinated to antidiscrimination concerns, authoritarianism would inexorably
follow--a conclusion supported by experience with speech restrictions on college
campuses and, recently, in Canada. This Essay concludes by pointing out that those legal
scholars who are most eager to restrict the First Amendment are ironically among those
most in need of its protections.
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Introduction
Three years ago, the Supreme Court in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale [FN1] held that
the First Amendment right of expressive association trumped a public accommodations
statute that prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation. [FN2] Dale has
received a great deal of attention in law reviews, [FN3] but almost all of the writing on
Dale has focused on the scope of the expressive association doctrine. Commentators
meanwhile have largely ignored the broader issue of the growing conflict between
antidiscrimination laws and the First Amendment. [FN4]
This conflict is manifesting itself in a wide range of contexts. For example, in Berkeley,
California, the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
threatened to sanction three neighborhood activists for organizing community opposition
to a plan to turn a rundown hotel into a homeless center. [FN5]HUD alleged that the
activists had violated the Fair Housing Act by interfering with a project that would serve
a group of people who would be disproportionately mentally ill or recovering substance
abusers, protected groups under the Act. [FN6] HUD spokesperson John Phillips, trying
to parry free speech concerns raised by the media, instead stoked them. [FN7] "To ask
questions is one thing," Phillips told reporters, "To write brochures and articles and go
out and actively organize people to say, 'We don't want those people in those structures,'
is another." [FN8]
In San Francisco, California, Krissy Keefer is using an antidiscrimination law to
challenge the artistic autonomy of the San Francisco Ballet. [FN9] She is suing the ballet
for height and weight discrimination for refusing to accept her daughter Fredrika into its
pre-professional program. [FN10] Fredrika is of average height and weight, while
modern ballet's aesthetic standards require that dancers be tall and lithe. [FN11]
In Denver, Colorado, the city government refused to issue a Columbus Day parade
permit unless the organizers signed an agreement stating that "there can be 'no references,
depictions, or acknowledgment of Christopher Columbus' during the parade . . . [and] no .
. . speeches or wreath laying for Christopher Columbus will be conducted." [FN12] The
city was responding to pressure from American Indian activists, who alleged that a
parade celebrating Columbus would create an illegal "hostile public environment."
[FN13]
In Minneapolis, Minnesota, a group of librarians complained of sexual harassment
because patrons using library computers viewed images the librarians saw and found
offensive. [FN14] The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission found that the
librarians had "probable cause" to pursue their claim. Because of this and similar cases,
public and private libraries throughout the United States are under pressure to install
filtering software on their computers, lest a librarian inadvertently view offensive
material and file a sexual harassment lawsuit. Defining the issue precisely backwards, a
representative of the National Organization for Women told the New York Times that she

wondered "how far First Amendment rights may go before they infringe on sexual
harassment laws." [FN15]
In Eugene, Oregon, the state Newspaper Publishers Association published a list of
eighty words and phrases that its members should ban from real estate advertisements to
avoid liability under federal, state, or local fair housing laws. [FN16] The forbidden
words and phrases include language that signifies an obvious intent to violate fair
housing laws (e.g., "no Mexicans"), but also language that is merely descriptive, such as
"near church" or "walking distance to synagogue." [FN17] Fair housing officials
overzealously interpret such phrases as expressing an illicit preference for Christians and
Jews, respectively. [FN18] The list also includes phrases that some fair housing officials
believe are used as codes to discourage minorities ("exclusive neighborhood," "board
approval required") or families with children ("quiet tenants," "bachelor pad"). [FN19]
There are a number of other phrases that did not make the Oregon list, but that some
realtors avoid nonetheless for fear of liability, including the following: "master bedroom"
(either sexist or purportedly evocative of slavery and therefore insulting to African
Americans), "great view" (allegedly expresses preference for the nonblind), and "walkup" (supposedly discourages the disabled). [FN20]
Religious conservatives have also jumped on the antidiscrimination bandwagon. In
Wellsville, Ohio, Dolores Stanley celebrated her new job as manager of the local Dairy
Mart by removing Playboy and Penthouse from the store's shelves. [FN21]"It goes
against everything I believe in as a Christian," Stanley said. [FN22] "There's no way I
could participate in that." [FN23] Stanley's superiors at corporate headquarters,
attempting to exercise Dairy Mart's First Amendment right to sell legal magazines, told
Stanley to replace the periodicals. [FN24] She refused and was fired. The American
Family Association, a conservative anti-pornography organization, represented Stanley in
a lawsuit against Dairy Mart for sex and religious discrimination and for subjecting her to
a "hostile work environment." [FN25] The case settled before trial for a sum "well into
the six figures." [FN26]
These anecdotes are merely a few examples of antidiscrimination laws' threat to civil
liberties. [FN27] This Essay argues that the resolution of this conflict should favor civil
liberties. Given the moral authority of antidiscrimination law in a society still recovering
from a viciously racist past, writing an essay critical of many of antidiscrimination law's
applications is necessarily perilous, the law professor's equivalent of a politician
disparaging mom and apple pie. The laudable goal of the ever- broadening
antidiscrimination edifice is to achieve a fairer, more just society. Yet even, or perhaps
especially, well-meaning attempts to achieve a praiseworthy goal must be criticized when
the means used to achieve that goal become a threat to civil liberties.
The student who callously utters a racial epithet, the bigots who refuse to admit Jews to
their clubs, the co-worker who tells obnoxious sexist jokes, and the neighbor who lobbies
against housing for the mentally ill--the actions of these individuals can be infuriating.
But the alternative to protecting the constitutional rights of such scoundrels is much
worse: the gradual evisceration of the pluralism, autonomy, and check on government
power that civil liberties provide.

Nevertheless, the First Amendment's protection of civil liberties from laws reflecting
antidiscrimination concerns has come under withering attack from leading legal scholars.
[FN28] History teaches that when constitutional provisions lose the support of the
public, and especially the support of the legal elite from which federal judges are drawn,
those provisions are enervated. Courts will continue to pay lip service to such provisions,
but will fail to properly enforce them. [FN29]
Given this dynamic, the prospects for continued judicial protection of civil liberties when
they conflict with antidiscrimination concerns are uncertain. Over the last two decades,
radical scholars, including many feminists and critical race theorists, have vociferously
attacked the First Amendment as a barrier to the government's ability to pursue sex and
racial equality. [FN30] Anti-free speech feminists would ban what they call "expressive
means of practicing inequality . . . such as academic books purporting to document
women's biological inferiority to men . . . or [claiming] that reports of rape are routinely
fabricated." [FN31] Critical race theorists, meanwhile, suggest that racist expression is
"so dangerous, and so tied to perpetuation of violence and degradation of the very classes
of human beings who are least equipped to respond that it is properly treated as outside
the realm of protected discourse." [FN32]
Prominent mainstream liberal law professors, such as Owen Fiss, Frank Michelman, and
Cass Sunstein, increasingly echo the feminists' and critical race theorists'views. [FN33]
The liberal left's prior consensus favoring freedom of speech arose from a belief that a
robust, uninhibited political discourse was not only good in itself and of instrumental
value to a functioning democracy, but was also beneficial to liberalism's constituencies.
[FN34] Left-liberal solicitude for free speech in part arose because the great free speech
cases for most of the twentieth century involved left-wing constituencies under assault
from the government.
Anarchists, communists, labor organizers, socialists, syndicalists, pacifists, and civil
rights activists all benefitted from the First Amendment. [FN35] Today, by contrast,
"speech cases are often won by corporations, the media, and other powerful insiders."
[FN36] According to feminist scholar Mary Becker, "[p]owerful private actors, such as
pornographers and the media, are free to control, suppress, and distort the speech of
others, and when they do, political processes cannot redress it." [FN37]
Liberal legal scholars' growing suspicion of freedom of speech, combined with their
strong egalitarian commitments, leads to a powerful impetus to seek to weaken civil
liberties protections against antidiscrimination laws. A powerful, consistent, normative
defense of the First Amendment is therefore greatly needed. This Essay seeks to provide
the outlines of such a defense.

Part I of this Essay defends the "marketplace of ideas" paradigm from its critics. This
author concludes that an unregulated marketplace of ideas should be defended, not

because the marketplace of ideas is efficient and always leads to benign results, but
because the alternative of government regulation is far worse. [FN38]
Part II of this Essay defends freedom of speech from Stanley Fish's claims that "there is
no such thing as free speech," [FN39] and that defenses of freedom of expression are
mere substitutes for particular political agendas. Fish argues that courts therefore should
not sacrifice values such as equality and human dignity to free speech concerns. [FN40]
Part II argues that judges can in fact defend a relatively neutral conception of free speech,
and, moreover, that if there really is no such thing as free speech, then there is no such
thing as equality or human dignity, either.
Part III of this Essay critiques mainstream liberal academics, such as Professor Andrew
Koppelman, who argue that courts should tolerate partial restrictions on freedom of
expression until certain egalitarian goals are met. [FN41] Such views rely on a naive
conception of politics that bears little relation to how political markets actually work.
Part IV of this Essay rebuts those who argue that hate speech and discrimination cause
such serious moral harm that civil libertarian concerns simply must be pushed aside when
combating these evils. If the courts adopted such a view authoritarianism would
inexorably follow, a conclusion supported by experience with speech restrictions on
college campuses and, recently, in Canada.
This Essay concludes by pointing out that those legal scholars who are most eager to
restrict the First Amendment are among those most in need of its protection.
I. Defending the Marketplace of Ideas
The primary civil libertarian defense of freedom of expression from government
suppression is that such freedom is necessary to ensure the existence of a robust
marketplace of ideas. More effusive advocates of the marketplace of ideas paradigm
suggest that freedom of expression helps ensure the triumph of reason over prejudice, of
enlightened public opinion over entrenched political and economic power. [FN42] This
argument has some force, given the notable successes of the marketplace of ideas in
recent American history. As recently as the 1940s, Catholics and Jews were excluded
from many universities, private clubs, and corporations, African Americans were
segregated by law in the South and subjected to routine discrimination almost everywhere
else, Japanese Americans were incarcerated in concentration camps, American Indian
children were removed from their parents and forcibly assimilated in boarding schools,
and male homosexuals were generally thought to be pedophilic perverts. The status of
these groups has improved dramatically, due to social and political changes made
possible only because the Constitution's guarantee of freedom of expression prevented
defenders of the status quo from institutionalizing orthodox attitudes.
Nevertheless, at first blush the marketplace of ideas paradigm seems to be an inadequate
justification for inhibiting government regulation of speech, especially if one thinks about
it in economic terms. [FN43] The unregulated marketplace of ideas is highly imperfect,

and far less perfect than an unregulated economic market when it comes to protecting
members of minority groups. A free economic market protects minorities from
discrimination to some degree because businesspeople have an economic incentive to
hire the best workers and obtain the most customers. [FN44] Meanwhile, minorities get
relatively little protection in the marketplace of ideas.
The average citizen seeking an ideology to guide his voting and other political activity
has virtually no incentive to seek and find truth, especially since his opinion is highly
unlikely to be decisive on any given matter. [FN45] On the other hand, it makes perfect
sense for citizens to take pleasure in supporting positions they find intuitively appealing
despite their ignorance. When average citizens commit to an ideological position, they
will normally adopt a position that either makes them feel good for some reason, or that
sends a signal to their social cohort that they are "good people," regardless of the
objective validity of the position.[FN46] The aggregation of votes by such "rationally
irrational" voters is quite dangerous, especially for minority groups, which are often the
subject of emotionally powerful but false myths, and against whom it often pays
members of the majority to exhibit social solidarity. [FN47]
Even voters who seek the truth regarding particular issues will have difficulty finding it.
The human mind is cognitively limited, and much more suited for certain tasks, such as
pursuing economic self-interest, than for others, such as adopting sensible ideological
positions. [FN48] As Nobel economics laureate Ronald Coase points out, "it's easier for
people to discover that they have a bad can of peaches than it is for them to discover that
they have a bad idea." [FN49] One can hardly explain the ubiquitous appeal of
nationalism, for example, as an outcome of reason. [FN50] To take a relatively
innocuous example, there is no rational reason for soccer fans worldwide to get into a
frenzy when the team representing their nation wins the World Cup.
Meanwhile, opportunistic propagandists and demagogues find it beneficial to foment
hatred based on false premises. As figures ranging from Adolf Hitler to Al Sharpton
show, racist rabble-rousing can lead to public acclaim, and even grand political careers.
While despised minorities can always find an economic haven even in a society where
most employers discriminate against them, there is no escape for minorities if purveyors
of racist ideas win out in the political process and capture the government. David Duke
[FN51] poses far more danger to minorities than does Denny's. [FN52]
If anything, then, restrictions on speech that denigrate vulnerable groups are more likely
to protect minorities and women over time than are laws banning discrimination in
employment. [FN53] Free speech critics, though generally ignoring economic/public
choice analysis, nevertheless manage to exploit the power of this point. Fiss, [FN54]
Sunstein, [FN55] Morton Horwitz, [FN56] Jack Balkin, [FN57] and others [FN58]
criticize liberal civil libertarians who vigorously oppose free market solutions to
economic problems, especially in the employment discrimination context, but support an
unregulated marketplace of ideas. If the government can make the economic marketplace
fairer and more efficient, they ask, why can it not do the same for the less efficient speech
marketplace?

One answer, provided by law and economics luminaries such as Ronald Coase, Richard
Epstein, and Richard Posner, is that government regulation of the economic marketplace
is at least as wrongheaded as government regulation of the marketplace of ideas. [FN59]
Epstein argues in favor of both a robust First Amendment and the repeal of
antidiscrimination laws that apply to private parties. [FN60] Indeed, he argues that the
two policies are synergistic because he doubts that freedom of speech and of religion can
ultimately be defended from civil rights laws once it is conceded that an
antidiscrimination norm is appropriate in the employment and property area. [FN61]
But even liberal civil libertarians who oppose laissez-faire economics and support civil
rights laws have a compelling rejoinder to advocates of censorship. Civil libertarians can
recognize that the free marketplace of ideas is imperfect, but still ask the most important
question in political economy, "compared to what?" [FN62] While much private speech
is harmful, wrongheaded or dangerous, it's even more dangerous to put the government in
charge of policing it. [FN63] The alternative to an unregulated speech marketplace is to
permit government censorship, leaving "the government in control of all of the
institutions of culture, the great censor and director of which thoughts are good for us."
[FN64] For good reason, civil libertarians believe that the government cannot be trusted
with the power to establish an official orthodoxy on any issue, cultural or political, or to
ensure the 'fairness' of political debate. As one scholar puts it: [F]reedom of speech is
based in large part on a distrust of the ability of government to make the necessary
distinctions, a distrust of government determinations of truth and falsity, an appreciation
of the fallibility of political leaders, and a somewhat deeper distrust of governmental
power in a more general sense. [FN65]
Freedom of expression is necessary to prevent government from entrenching itself and
expanding its power at the expense of the public. As Seventh Circuit Judge Frank
Easterbrook wrote in an opinion striking down an anti- pornography statute inspired by
academic feminists, "[f]ree speech has been on balance an ally of those seeking change.
Governments that want stasis start by restricting speech . . . . Without a strong guarantee
of freedom of speech, there is no effective right to challenge what is." [FN66] First
Amendment scholar John McGinnis likewise notes that "government officials have a
natural tendency to suppress speech antithetical to their interests . . . and that the free
flow of information related to politics and culture threatens government hierarchies both
by rearranging coalitions and revealing facts that will prompt political action." [FN67]
The framers of the American Constitution recognized that government, rather than
inherently serving the public interest, is susceptible to capture by factions that desire to
use the government for their own private ends, a phenomenon known in modern
academic literature as "rent-seeking." [FN68] The Constitution and Bill of Rights
attempted to establish a system of government that would limit such rent-seeking. [FN69]
The First Amendment's protection of freedom of expression was particularly important in
this regard. The Founders believed that once in power, factions would exploit any
government authority to regulate speech in self-serving ways, to promote their own
agendas, and/or to repress dissenting opinions. [FN70] The Founders' insights have been
confirmed by experience around the world, and by modern research into human political

behavior by economists and evolutionary psychologists. [FN71] Permitting government
regulation of information relating to politics or culture would come at a very high price to
society. [FN72]
Contrary to the insinuations of some critics, [FN73] then, civil libertarians recognize that
freedom of expression can create many negative side effects, or, as economists put it,
negative externalities. [FN74] But civil libertarians, aware of the voracious pursuit of
power and self-interest endemic to politicians and their rent-seeking allies, make the cold
calculus that the negative externalities caused by government regulation are likely to
outweigh any negative externalities that arise from freedom of expression. [FN75] This is
especially true in the United States. By contrast to more statist social systems, the United
States has largely maintained a Tocquevillian nature, where political and cultural
innovations arise from the grassroots, not from the government. [FN76] Freedom of
expression is therefore necessary for economic and cultural progress. [FN77]

II. Deconstructing Stanley Fish
Some scholars, most prominently Stanley Fish, argue that the ideal of neutral protection
of freedom of expression is illusory. [FN78] In the United States, the task of interpreting
the First Amendment falls mainly to the judiciary. Fish argues that judicial invocation of
freedom of expression merely masks politically-motivated actions. The only question
worth talking about, therefore, is who will get the power to censor whom. [FN79]
Fish is correct that judges are not Platonic guardians immune from political motivation.
Yet that does not mean that judges are motivated solely, or even primarily, by politics.
Academics have persuasively critiqued law and economics scholars for relying on too
narrow a view of human nature. [FN80] In particular, economists tend to treat individuals
as rational utility- maximizers, but ignore the power of psychology and social norms to
shape behavior. Similarly, Fish ignores the role of psychology and norms in shaping
judicial behavior.
Judges, who are trained from their law school days that the role of the judiciary is to
fairly enforce constitutional rights, will find their self- image bound up in their ability to
eschew personal prejudices and act fairly. [FN81] This has practical consequences. For
example, federal judges in the late nineteenth century and mid-twentieth century
protected the rights of Chinese immigrants and African Americans, respectively, even
though the judges often had little sympathy for those groups' aspirations, and even though
local political culture was strongly hostile to those groups. [FN82] Political biases and
temptations will always exist for judges, but they will be tempered by the norm of
judicial objectivity--unless Fish and his colleagues succeed in destroying that norm, by
persuading judges that law and politics are indistinguishable.
Another irony is that Fish and his allies attack claims of neutrality by "employ[ing] an
epistemology that denies all eternal verities." [FN83] Simultaneously, however, "they
establish current notions of racial and gender equality as an unquestionable, transcendent
truth." [FN84] For example, Fish writes that: free speech" is just the name we give to
verbal behavior that serves the substantive agendas we wish to advance; and we give our
preferred verbal behaviors that name when we can, when we have the power to do so,
because in the rhetoric of American life, the label "free speech" is the one you want your
favorites to wear. [FN85]
Since the concept of freedom of expression is merely a political device to promote
particular agendas, there is no reason to suffer racist and sexist expression in its name,
given the dangers such speech poses to the dignity and equality of its targets. [FN86]
Yet, if we accept Fish's view that there is "no such thing as freedom of speech" because
everything comes down to politics, then there is no such thing as "dignity" or "equality"
either. Those who argue that purportedly illusory notions of freedom of speech should be
sacrificed to equalitarian commitments that are based on notions at least as delusive
cannot possibly explain why.

III. The Dangers of "Temporary" Speech Restrictions
Some scholars recognize the dangers inherent in governmental regulation of speech, but
call for limited censorship to achieve what they consider particularly important
antidiscrimination ends. Professor Andrew Koppelman, for example, argues that there
should be a presumption in favor of freedom of expression because "[r]acist speech may
be substantively worthless, but outlawing it would give the state the power to decide
which political views are worthless because they are racist." [FN87] Although
Koppelman acknowledges that government power to censor speech can be "easily
abused," he adds that censorship can be justified if the speech in question is "exceedingly
harmful." [FN88] In such cases, "a significant, but limited,infringement on free speech"
[FN89] would be appropriate.
Koppelman would discard speech restrictions when they have served their purpose of
achieving "workplace equality" for previously excluded minorities and women.
[FN90]This suggestion shows the dangers of political philosophy divorced from political
economy. Koppelman never clarifies how the government either could in theory or would
in practice determine objectively which speech is sufficiently harmful to merit
censorship. With the First Amendment nullified, censorship decisions would ultimately
be made through ordinary politics, where the problems of voter ignorance, rent-seeking,
and the like would arise. [FN91] In the long run, speech restrictions would likely serve
the interests of dominant political factions, with no guarantee that those factions would
represent the progressive political forces supported by Koppelman. [FN92]
Moreover, even assuming speech restrictions could be limited to the goals set out for
them by Koppelman, he provides no guidance on how speech restrictions would
ultimately be abolished once they are in place. He does not explain how Congress or
state legislatures will reach a consensus that the goals of speech restrictions have been
achieved. Koppelman also does not explain how legislators would override the lobbying
power of the interest groups that would inevitably coalesce to defend the restrictions.
Congress, for example, has not been able to summon the will to permanently abolish
mohair subsidies enacted to ensure fabric availability for World
War I army uniforms. [FN93] It is hardly likely to muster the courage to abolish
entrenched censorship rules.
IV. The Dangers of Unmitigated Egalitarianism
Some legal scholars would concede many of the points made in this Essay, but
nevertheless argue that antidiscrimination concerns should trump freedom of expression
because the offense taken by those who are the targets of group obloquy is an especially
serious moral harm. [FN94] For example, many distinguished academics argue that
because of the offense taken by the listener, even core First Amendment protection of
freedom of speech must yield to "hate speech" laws targeting malicious (and sometimes
merely inadvertently offensive) speech. [FN95]

Punishing expression because it creates offense has totalitarian implications, as has been
amply demonstrated on university campuses that have prohibited their faculties and
students from offending each other in politically incorrect ways. Sarah Lawrence
College, for example, punished a student for "inappropriate laughter" after the student
snorted when his roommate called another student a "fag." [FN96] Other colleges have
banned inconsiderate jokes, speech that threatens a student's self-esteem, inappropriate
eye contact, and licking one's lips in a provocative manner. [FN97] More generally,
campus intolerance of any speech deemed offensive to designated victim groups has led
to serious miscarriages of justice, as campus activist groups utilize speech codes to
suppress dissent from politically correct orthodoxy. [FN98] Another egregious example
of the crackdown on freedom of expression on campus is the theft and destruction of
campus newspapers containing stories or advertisements deemed offensive, the modern
campus equivalent of book burnings. [FN99] This practice has been both widespread and
generally implicitly tolerated [FN100] by university administrations even though it
evinces a decidedly authoritarian intolerance for open debate. Private universities have
the right to enact and enforce foolish policies. But campus authoritarianism provides a
scary glimpse at the potential future of antidiscrimination policies that will be pursued at
all levels of American government if civil liberties protections are not maintained.
A glance at events in Canada, where the sensitivity police have made more gains than in
the United States, reveals more scary precedents. In 1990, the Canadian Supreme Court
upheld hate speech laws against a freedom of speech defense. [FN101] James Keegstra, a
public high school teacher, consistently propagated Holocaust denial and his anti-Semitic
views to public high school students, despite warnings from his superiors to cease. Even
in the United States, Keegstra could be disciplined or even fired for ignoring his
obligations to stick to his assigned curriculum, and for using his classroom as a forum for
promoting hatred. Instead of stopping there, the government charged and convicted
Keegstra of the criminal offense of "willfully promoting hatred against an identifiable
group" in violation of Canada's hate crimes law, which carries a penalty of up to two
years in jail. [FN102] On appeal, the Canadian Supreme Court upheld the conviction,
despite the Canadian Constitution's protection of freedom of expression. Criminalizing
hate speech, the court stated, was a "reasonable" restriction on expression, and therefore
passed constitutional muster. [FN103]
Two years later, the Canadian Supreme Court held that obscenity laws were
unconstitutional to the extent they criminalized material purely based on its sexual
content. However, any "degrading or dehumanizing" depiction of sexual activity,
including material that the First Amendment would clearly protect in the United States,
was deprived of constitutional protection in order to protect women and other groups
from discrimination. [FN104] The opinion drew heavily on language from a brief coauthored by American feminist and leading censorship advocate Catherine MacKinnon.
The inevitable result of these decisions has been the gradual but significant growth of
censorship and suppression of civil liberties across Canada. The Canadian Supreme
Court, for example, turned down an appeal by a Christian minister convicted of inciting
hatred against Muslims. [FN105] An Ontario appellate court had found that the minister

did not intentionally incite hatred, but was properly convicted for being willfully blind to
the effects of his actions. [FN106] Robert Martin, a professor of constitutional law at the
University of Western Ontario, commented that he increasingly thinks that "Canada now
is a totalitarian theocracy. I see this as a country ruled today by what I would describe as
a secular state religion [of political correctness]. Anything that is regarded as heresy or
blasphemy is not tolerated." [FN107]
Indeed, it has apparently become illegal in Canada to advocate traditionalChristian
opposition to homosexual sex. For example, the Saskatchewan Human Rights
Commission ordered the Saskatoon Star Phoenix newspaper and Hugh Owens to each
pay $4,500 (appoximately $3,000 U.S.) to each of three gay activists as damages for
publication of an advertisement placed by Owens conveying the message that the Bible
condemns homosexual acts. [FN108] The ad conveyed this message by citing passages
from the Bible, with an equal sign placed between the verse references and a drawing of
two males holding hands overlaid with the universal nullification symbol, a red circle
with a diagonal bar.
In another incident, after Toronto print shop owner Scott Brockie refused on religious
grounds to print letterhead for a gay activist group, the local human rights commission
ordered him to pay the group $5,000 (approximately $3,400 U.S.), print the requested
material, and apologize to the group's leaders. Brockie, who always accepted print jobs
from individual gay customers, and even did pro bono work for a local AIDS group, is
fighting the decision on religious freedom grounds. [FN109] An appellate court has
upheld the fine, though it did add that it would have ruled the other way had the material
in question impinged more directly on Brockie's "core beliefs," such as a publication
advocating homosexual behavior. [FN110] As of this writing, another appeal is pending,
with Brockie already having spent $100,000 (approximately $68,000 U.S.) in legal fees.
[FN111]
Any gains the gay rights movement has received from the crackdown on speech in
Canada have been pyrrhic, because as part of the Canadian government's suppression of
obscene material, Canadian customs officials frequently target books with homosexual
content. Customs seizures have included Pornography, a book by MacKinnon
collaborator and prominent feminist Andrea Dworkin, and several serious novels. A gay
organization had to spend $14,000 (approximately $9,600 U.S.) in legal fees to force
customs agents to allow The Joy of Gay Sex into the country. Police raids searching for
obscene materials have disproportionately targeted gay organizations and bookstores.
[FN112] Two gay activists at the University of Toronto were fined for selling Bad
Attitude, a lesbian magazine with sadomasochistic content. [FN113] According to the
ACLU, "more than half of all feminist bookstores in Canada have had materials
confiscated or the sales of some materials suspended by the government." [FN114] The
Canadians are, therefore, living proof of the way progressive censorship rules can come
back to bite the constituencies that endorsed them.
A great deal more censorship in Canada seems inevitable. British Columbia, for
example, has an extremely broad hate speech law that prohibits the publication of any

statement that "indicates" discrimination or is "likely" to expose a person or group or
class of persons to hatred or contempt. [FN115] Professor Sunera Thobani of the
University of British Columbia, a native of Tanzania, faced a hate crimes investigation
under this statute after she delivered a vicious diatribe against American foreign policy.
Thobani, a Marxist feminist and multiculturalist activist, remarked that Americans are
"bloodthirsty, vengeful and calling for blood." [FN116]
The hate crimes law was meant to protect minority groups from hate speech, but in this
case was invoked to protect Americans. The police revealed the investigation to the
media, despite a general policy against doing so, because, as a hate crimes investigator
explained:
Here we have a complaint against someone who is
obviously from a visible minority, whom the complainant
feels is promoting hate. Normally, people think it's a white
supremacist or Caucasians, promoting hate against visible
minorities. . . .
We want to get the message out that it's wrong, all around. [FN117] If Americans are
going to preserve their civil liberties, then, they will need to develop thicker skin. One
price of living in a free society is toleration of those who intentionally or unintentionally
offend others. The current trend, however, is to give offended parties a legal remedy, as
long as the offense can be construed as "discrimination." Yet to the extent the legal
system gives people a remedy for offense, they are more likely to feel offended. This is
true for two reasons. First, as economists point out, if you subsidize something, you get
more of it. [FN118] If the legal remedies of antidiscrimination law, particularly
monetary remedies, subsidize feelings of outrage and insult, we will get more feelings of
outrage and insult, a net social loss. Economists have also noted the psychological
endowment effect: once people are endowed with a right, they lose far more utility once
that right is interfered with than if it had never been granted at all. [FN119]
Unfortunately, Americans increasingly coddle and even reward the hypersensitive and
easily outraged, perversely encouraging more people to be hypersensitive and easily
outraged. In one notorious incident, a Washington, D.C. official was forced to resign for
using the word "niggardly" at a meeting because the word sounded like a racial epithet,
even though it is actually an innocuous synonym, of Scandinavian origin, for "miserly."
[FN120] It should hardly be surprising, then, that people are suing and winning damages
when offended by colleagues at work, [FN121] when
excluded by a private club [FN122] or turned down as a roommate, [FN123] or for being
fired from a church-run school after going back on their promise to obey church doctrine.
[FN124]
Preserving liberalism, and the civil liberties that go with it, requires a certain level of
virtue by the citizenry. Among those necessary virtues is tolerance of those who
intentionally or unintentionally offend, and sometimes, when civil liberties are
implicated, who blatantly discriminate. A society that undercuts civil liberties in pursuit
of the "equality" offered by a statutory right to be free from all slights will ultimately end

up with neither equality nor civil liberties. The violation of civil liberties required to
achieve this kind of equality will diminish constitutional restraints on the government,
and the additional power garnered by the government, introduced for noble purposes, will
end up in the hands of people who use it to promote their own interests. In these days of
the “Oprahization” of public discourse, with even presidential candidates swearing that
they feel the public's pain, asking for a measure of fortitude in the face of offense and
discrimination is asking a lot. Yet, in the end, it is a small price to pay for preserving
civil liberties.

Conclusion
Ironically, protecting freedom of expression from government regulation ultimately will
benefit left-wing scholars who support censorship, such as radical feminists and critical
race theorists, as much as anyone. These scholars advocate speech regulations while
living primarily in the very left-wing academic world, where their views are only
marginally out of the mainstream. Yet, if the First Amendment is weakened sufficiently
by antidiscrimination law that the government gains the power to suppress speech more
broadly, feminists and critical race theorists, as holders of views wildly at variance to
those of the public at large, are likely to be among the first victims. [FN125] That leftists
writing in a society that has long been and continues to be hostile to their ideology
[FN126] would want to weaken the principle that government may not suppress
expression because of hostility to its viewpoint seems counterintuitive, to say the least.
Indeed, many critical race scholars and feminists argue that America is innately and
irredeemably racist and sexist. [FN127] One need not accept this vision to realize that
the Critical Race and Radical Feminist Party, if such a thing existed, would not exactly
sweep the American electorate anytime soon. [FN128] Because many critical race
theorists and feminists claim to believe that America is so hostile to their values, they
should find constitutional protections against the majority especially meaningful.
Indeed, if left-wing professors wish to preserve their own academic freedom, they will
need to learn to be more tolerant of those whose speech they currently seek to suppress.
For the last several decades, pressure to censor free speech on university campuses has
come primarily from the left. The current war against terrorism, and the frequent dissent
within the academy to that war, has shifted the dynamic, putting many radical professors
on the defensive. The First Amendment, and
the values of academic freedom that it has fostered, will protect the vast majority of
dissenters, but only because the radical's war against the First Amendment has as yet
been largely unsuccessful.
Of course, left-wing censors imagine a world in which the government silences only their
ideological enemies, and they advocate censorship as an integral part of a much broader
scheme for reconstructing society along egalitarian lines. Yet, it should be a cardinal
principle of political advocacy that one should not support granting the government
regulatory powers that one would not want applied to oneself. This principle would not
only reduce hypocrisy, but also remind political activists that politics is unpredictable,
driven by power rather than morality. Power given to government is often unexpectedly
ultimately used against those who advocated that the power be exercised against others.
As William Graham Sumner remarked many years ago:
The advocate of [government] interference takes it for
granted that he and his asociates will have the
administration of their legislative device in their own
hands. . . . They never appear to remember that the device,
when once set up, will itself be the prize of a struggle; that

it will serve one set of purposes as well as another, so that
after all the only serious question is: who will get it?"
[FN129]
This is a lesson that academic advocates of censorship would do well to learn.
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